Online users generate tremendous amounts of textual information by participating in different activities, such as writing reviews and sharing tweets. This textual data provides opportunities for researchers and business partners to study and understand individuals. However, this user-generated textual data not only can reveal the identity of the user but also may contain individual's private information (e.g., age, location, gender). Hence, "you are what you write" as the saying goes. Publishing the textual data thus compromises the privacy of individuals who provided it. The need arises for data publishers to protect people's privacy by anonymizing the data before publishing it. It is challenging to design effective anonymization techniques for textual information which minimizes the chances of re-identification and does not contain users' sensitive information (high privacy) while retaining the semantic meaning of the data for given tasks (high utility). In this paper, we study this problem and propose a novel double privacy preserving text representation learning framework, DPText, which learns a textual representation that (1) is differentially private, (2) does not contain private information and (3) retains high utility for the given task. Evaluating on two natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment analysis and part of speech tagging, we show the effectiveness of this approach in terms of preserving both privacy and utility.
INTRODUCTION
1 Textual information is one of the most significant portions of data that users generate by participating in different online activities such as leaving online reviews, and posting tweets. On one hand, textual data consists of abundant information about users' behavior, 1 This is an extended version of the original paper published as a poster paper in the proceedings of the 30th ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social Media (HyperText'19) [13] Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). WOODSTOCK '19, 2019 © 2016 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 123-4567-24-567/08/06. https://doi.org/10.475/123_4 preferences and needs which is critical for understanding individuals by profiling them at unprecedented scales. For example, data consumers such as service providers and business partners, use textual data to study customers' behaviors, track users' responses to products, advertise more efficiently, and provide personalized services to users according to their needs. Textual data has been used in many tasks such as sentiment analysis, part-of-speech tagging and information extraction and retrieval [31] . Textual data thus has tremendous usages by various data consumers and have become one of the profitable resources for data publisher [1, 51] .
On the other hand, publishing intact user-generated textual data makes users vulnerable against privacy issues. The reason is that the textual data itself contains sufficient information that allows people in the textual database to be re-identified [9, 11, 50] and leaks their private attribute information [15, 43, 48] . Thus, "you are what you write" as the saying goes. Take the following tweet as an example:
Dr.appt Tuesday morning was told I need to lose 30 pounds by X-Mas, have high cholesterol, and high blood pressure. Today starting counting calories #myfitnesspal and juicing for dinner 2 This user may not be aware that the sensitive medical condition information can be easily inferred from this post-exposing symptoms of Diabetes. If intact users' textual data is available, a malicious data consumer (or any potential adversary) can easily infer lots of sensitive and private information from text that users' do not explicitly disclose such as vacation plans, medical conditions, age and location [15, 31] . Another privacy issue arises when a malicious data consumer attempts to re-identify the identity of an individual in the database by investigating whether a targeted user's textual data is in the database or inferring which record is associated with it. Therefore, publishing complete and intact users' textual data risks exposing their privacy by allowing an adversary to figure out what they are.
These users' privacy concerns, therefore, mandate data publishers to protect privacy by anonymizing the data before sharing it with data consumers. The ultimate goal of an anonymization approach is to preserve user privacy while ensuring the utility of the published data for future tasks and usages. One straightforward technique is to remove "Personally Identifiable Information" (a.k.a. PII) such as names and users' IDs. This solution has shown to be insufficient to protect people's privacy. Examples of insufficiencies are the anonymized dataset published for the Netflix prize challenge [44] and the AOL search data leak [7] in which users were re-identified according to their reviews and search queries, respectively. Various protection techniques for structured data have been developed over the years such as k-anonymity and differential privacy. However, traditional privacy preserving techniques are inefficient for user-generated textual data because this data is highly unstructured, noisy and unlike traditional documental content, consists of large numbers of short and informal posts [25] . Moreover, these works may impose a significant utility loss for protecting textual data as they may not explicitly include utility into the design objective of the privacy protection model. It is thus challenging to design effective anonymization techniques for user-generated textual data which preserves both privacy and utility.
To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a double privacy preserving text representation learning framework, called DPText. The proposed framework seeks to learn a privacy preserved text representation so that 1) a malicious data consumer (or any potential adversary) cannot infer whether or not a target text representation is in the dataset, 2) the adversary cannot deduce users' private attribute from the learned representation, and 3) the semantic meaning of the original textual information is still preserved in the learned representation. The learned privacy preserved textual information will be then shared with data consumers.
Our double privacy preserving framework protects individuals' privacy against identity re-identification and leakage of private information. Inspired by the recent success in adversarial learning [27] , we build DPText through an integrated process which consists of an auto-encoder, a differential-privacy-based noise adder and two discriminator-learning components (illustrated in Figure 1 ). We deploy a document auto-encoder to extract latent representation of the original text's content. The noise adder then adds noise to the text representation by adopting a Laplacian mechanism in order to guarantee differential privacy. Although guaranteeing differential privacy minimizes the chances of revealing whether or not a target text representation is in the database, it cannot prevent the adversary from learning user's private information. Moreover, adding too much noise can destroy the semantic meaning of the textual information. To infer the amount of added noise w.r.t. these constraints, we utilize two discriminators that regularize the noise adding process by incorporating necessary constraints. First, we incorporate a semantic discriminator to ensure that the semantic meaning of the perturbed text representation is preserved w.r.t. the given task (e.g., classification). Second, we introduce a private attribute discriminator to ensure that the perturbed representation does not contain private attributes.
In essence, we investigate the following challenges: 1) How should textual representation be perturbed to ensure that differential privacy is preserved?, 2) How could we control the amount of the added noise so that the semantic meaning of the text is preserved w.r.t the given task? and 3) How could we handle the amount of the added noise so that the user's private attributes are obscured? Our solution to these challenges results in a novel framework DPText. Our main contributions are summarized as:
• We study the problem of text annonymization by learning a differentially private representation that prevents text reconstruction and re-identification by minimizing the chance of attacker to infer whether target text representation is in the database;
• We provide a principled way to learn a textual representation that does not contain users' private attribute information while retaining the utility for a given task; and • We theoretically show that the learned representation is differentially private which confirms DPText minimizes the reidentification chance. We also conduct experiments on real-world datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of DPText in two important natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment prediction and part-of-speech (POS) tagging. Our empirical results show that DPText is able to keep the semantic meaning while obscuring private attribute information.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider an environment with three parties: online users, data publishers, and data consumers. Users generate textual information via various online activities such as posting online information, tweeting and writing reviews. These information are all collected by data publishers for future usage. A data publisher can be a social media service provider such as Twitter or Facebook or a third-party data company who partners with social media platforms and has access to users' information [51] . For example, DataSift 3 is a thirdparty company that has access to Twitter's Firehost engine and thus accesses to complete and intact Twitter data including users' tweets. The data publisher can share the collected and anonymize data to data consumers according to users' consent and privacy policies.
Data consumers obtain user-generated data by sending requests to data publishers and then use the textual data for understanding individuals at unprecedented scales. Business providers, government agencies and researchers are examples of data consumers. Note that data consumers may not be able to obtain complete and intact user-generated textual data without the support of data publisher. As we discussed earlier, textual information is rich in content. It can leak users' privacy by allowing users' in the textual database to be re-identified [50] and leaking their private attribute information [15, 43] . Our focus in this paper is to design an effective text anonymiztion technique for the data publisher to preserve users' privacy by preventing a potential adversary (i.e., malicious data consumer) from breaching privacy of users while maintaining the utility of their textual information for future tasks.
Let X = {x 1 , ..., x N } denotes a set of N documents and P = {p 1 , ..., p T } denotes a set of T private and sensitive attributes. Each document x i is composed of a sequence of words, i.e., x i = {x 1 i , ..., x m i }. We denote z i ∈ R d ×1 as the latent representation of the original document x i . We would like to use x i in the given task T (e.g., classification). However, we want to preserve users' privacy by preventing a potential adversary from inferring whether a target text representation is in the dataset or which record is associated with it or being able to learn the target users' private attribute information. Thus, in this paper, we study the following problem: Problem 1. Given a set of documents X, set of sensitive attributes P, and given task T , learn a function f that can generate and release a manipulated latent representationz i , for each document x i so that, 1) the adversary cannot re-identify a targeted text representation and infer whether or not this latent representation is in the database, 2) the adversary cannot infer the targeted user's private attributes P from the generated representationz i , and 3) the generated representatioñ z i is good for the given task T , i.e.,z i = f (x i , P, T ).
Note that in our work, the goal is to achieve a protection against possible attacks of malicious data consumers who have access to the released textual information, but not against the system (i.e., text representation learner) which we assume is trusted.
BACKGROUND
Here, we review the technical preliminaries of differential privacy which is required for the rest of the discussion. Differential privacy is a powerful technique which protects a user's privacy during statistical query over a database by minimizing the chance of privacy leakage while maximizing the accuracy of queries [23] . Differential privacy provides a strong privacy guarantee.The intuition behind differential privacy is that the risk of user's privacy leakage should not increase as a result of participating in a database [23] . Differential privacy guarantees that existence of an instance in the database does not pose a threat to its privacy as the statistical information of data would not change significantly in comparison to the case that the instance is absent [23] . This makes it harder for the adversary to re-identify an instance and infer whether the instance is in the database or not or decide which record is associated with it [35] . We denote an algorithm with privacy property by A p , which is randomized so that the re-identification of the data on the adversary's side is very difficult. Differential privacy can be formally defined: Definition 1. ϵ -Differential Privacy. An algorithm A p is ϵ-differential private if for any subset of outputs R and for all datasets D 1 and D 2 differing in at most one element:
where A p (D 1 ) and A p (D 2 ) are the outputs of the algorithm for input datasets D 1 and D 1 , respectively and P is the randomness of the noise in the algorithm.
Here ϵ is called privacy budget and it can be also shown that Eq. 1 is equivalent to |log
| ≤ ϵ for some point r in the output range. Note that larger values of ϵ (e.g., 10) results in larger privacy loss while smaller values (e.g., ϵ ≤ 0.1) indicate the opposite. For example, a small ϵ means that the output probabilities of D 1 and D 2 at r are very similar to each other which demonstrates more privacy. According to Dwork et al. [24] , an uncertainty should be introduced in the output of a function (i.e., algorithm) to be able to hide the participation of an individual in the database. This is quantified by sensitivity, which is the amount of the change in the output of function A made by a single data point in the worst case: Definition 2. L 1 -sensitivity. The L 1 -sensitivity of a vector-valued function A is the maximum change in the L 1 norm of the value of the function A when one input changes. More formally, the L 1 -sensitivity ∆(A) if A is defined as [24] :
where X and X ′ are two datasets differ in one entry. Next, we discuss the details of our proposed framework DPText.
THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Here, we discuss the details of double privacy preserving text representation learning framework. We illustrate the entire model in Figure 1 . This framework consists of four major components: 1) an auto-encoder for text representation, 2) differential-privacy-based noise adder, 3) a semantic meaning discriminator, and 4) a private attribute discriminator. The auto-encoder A aims to learn the content representation of a document by minimizing the reconstruction error. Then, the differential-privacy-based noise adder adds a random noise, i.e., Laplacian noise, to the original text representation w.r.t. a given privacy budget to further satisfy the differential privacy guarantee. Since adding noise neither preserves semantic meaning nor necessarily prevents leakage of private attributes, semantic meaning and private attributes discriminators are utilized to infer the amount of the added noise. The semantic meaning discriminator D S ensures that the added noise does not destroy the semantic meaning w.r.t. a given task. The private attribute discriminator D P also guides the amount of added noise by ensuring that the manipulated representation does not include users' private information. Note that we assume that the framework is trusted and therefore everything to the left of the privacy barrier (the red dashed line in Figure 1 ) including the original textual information and intermediate results, are kept private. The final learned representation which is to the right of the privacy barrier is released to the public. The final output 1) is differentially private, 2) obscures private attribute information, and 3) preserves semantic meaning.
Extracting Textual Representation
Here, we demonstrate how to extract the content representation for a given document. Let x = {x 1 , ..., x m } be a textual document with m words. Auto-encoder has been widely utilized for text generation and has shown to be effective recently [17, 21] . We therefore use an auto-encoder A to extract content representation z from document x. Let E A : X → Z be an encoder that can infer the content representation z for a given document x, and D A : Z → X be a decoder that reconstruct the document from its learned representation.
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been shown to be effective for summarizing and learning semantic of unstructured noisy short texts [21, 47] . In this work, we apply RNN as the encoder to learn the latent representation of texts. RNN can learn a probability distribution over a sequence by being trained to predict the next symbol in a sequence. The RNN consists of a hidden state S and an optional output which operates on a word sequence x = {x 1 , ..., x m }. At each time step t, the hidden state s t of RNN is updated by,
After reading the end of the given document, we use the last hidden state of the RNN as the representation vector z ∈ R d ×1 of the document x. We employ the gated recurrent unit (GRU) as the cell type to build the RNN, which is designed in a manner to have a more persisted memory [21] . Let θ e denotes the parameters for the encoder E A . Then we will have:
Decoderx = D A (z, θ d ) takes z as the input to start the generation process and θ d denotes the parameters for the decoder D A . We use Figure 1 : The framework of DPText architecture. It consists of four components, a document auto-encoder, a differentialprivacy-based noise adder, a semantic meaning discriminator and a private attribute discriminator. We assume that DPText is trusted. Red dashed line shows the privacy barrier and everything to the left of it (i.e., the original data and intermediate results) are kept private. The final learned noisy representation to the right of the privacy barrier is released to the public. This output is a noisy representation which is differentially private, hides private information and has semantic meaning.
another RNN to build the decoder D A to generate the output word sequencex = {x 1 , ..,x m }. At each time step t, the hidden state of the decoder is computed as:
where s 0 = z. The two components of the proposed auto-encoder are jointly trained to minimize the negative conditional log-likelihood for all documents. We use the trained auto-encoder E A to obtain the content representation z ∈ R d ×1 according to Eq. 4 where d is the size of textual representation.
Preventing Text Re-identification and Reconstruction by Adding Noise
Textual information is rich in content and publishing this data without proper anonymization lead to privacy breach and revealing the identity of an individual. This can let the adversary infer if a targeted user's latent textual representation is in the database or which record is associated with it. Moreover, publishing a document's latent representation could result in leakage of the original text. In fact, recent advancement in adversarial machine learning shows that it is possible to recover the input textual information from its latent representation [30] . In this case, if an adversary has preliminary knowledge of the training model, they can readily reverse engineer the input, for example, by a GAN attack algorithm [30] . It is thus essential to protect the textual information before publishing it. Differential privacy is a powerful technique for preserving privacy of users' data included in a database and provides a privacy guarantee. Our method is inspired by Chaudhuri et al. [20] , where the differential privacy is achieved through adding a random noise, i.e., Laplacian noise, to the output of an algorithm A. This mechanism is known as output perturbation and it has been proved that under certain conditions this output perturbation mechanism will guarantee differential privacy [20] .
The main idea of the output perturbation mechanism is to add noise to the output of an algorithm to preserve its privacy. In our problem, the output is the original document latent representation z. The benefit of adding noise to this latent representation is two fold. First, it minimizes the chance of the re-identification of learned text representation by preventing the adversary to infer whether or not a target representation is in the database, and second, it makes it difficult for the adversary to recover the raw textual data. The goal here is thus to add noise to the output such that the differential privacy condition is satisfied. Laplacian mechanism is a popular way to add noise to preserve differential privacy. In particular, with Laplacian mechanism, we perturb the output z by adding Laplacian noise to it as follows:
where ϵ is the privacy budget, ∆ is the L 1 -sensitivity of the latent representation z, d the dimension of z, s the noise vector, s(i) and z(i) are the i-th element for vectors s and z, respectively. ∆ = 2d (see details in Section 5). Note that each element of the noise vector is drawn from Laplacian distribution.
Preserving Semantic Meaning
Perturbing the latent representation of the given text by adding noise to it (Eq. 6) prevents the adversary from re-constructing the text from its latent representation and guarantees differential privacy. However, this approach may destroy the semantic meaning of the text data. Semantic meaning is task-dependant, e.g., classification is one of the common tasks. In the case of sentiment analysis, sentiment is of semantic meaning in the given text and sentiment prediction is a classification task. In order to preserve the semantic meaning of the textual representation, we need to add an optimal amount of noise to the text latent representation which does not destroy the semantic meaning of the text data while ensuring data privacy. We approach this challenge by learning the amount of the added noise with the privacy budget ϵ in terms of training a
where θ D S are the weights associated with the softmax function andŷ represents the inferred label for the classification.
To preserve the semantic meaning of the text representation, we seek a noisy latent representation which retains high utility and accordingly contains enough information for a downstream task, e.g., classification. We define a semantic discriminator D S that aims to assign a correct class label to the perturbed representation, whose loss function is minimized as follows,
where C is the number of classes, and L denotes the cross entropy loss function. The one-hot encoding of the ground truth label for the classification task is also denoted by y and y(i) represents the i-th element of y, i.e., the ground truth label for i-th class.
To learn the value of the privacy budget ϵ, we employ the commonly used reparameterization trick [36] . Instead of directly sampling noise s(i) from Laplacian distribution (i.e., Eq. 6), this trick first samples a value r from a uniform distribution, i.e. r ∼ [0, 1], and then rewrites the amount of added noise s(i) as follows:
This is equivalent to sampling noise s from Lap( ∆ ϵ ). The advantage of doing so is that the parameter ϵ is now explicitly involved in the representation of the added noise, s, which makes it possible to use back-propagation to find the optimal value of ϵ. Large privacy budget ϵ could result in large privacy bounds. Hence, we add a constraint, ϵ < c 1 where c 1 is a predefined constraint.
Another challenge here is that,ŷ is inferred fromz after introducing noise to the original latent representation z. The noise is also sampled from the Laplacian distribution which results in large variance in the training process. To solve this issue and make the model more robust, we sample K copies of noise for each given document. In other words, we can rewrite Eq. 8 as follows:
where the goal is to minimize loss function L D S w.r.t. the parameters {θ D S , ϵ }, andŷ k = so f tmax(z k ; θ D S ). Note thatz k = z + s k in which s k is the k-th sample of the noise calculated with Eq. 9.
Protecting Private Information
We discuss how adding noise to the latent representation of the text can prevent adversary from learning the input textual information and guarantee differential privacy. Another important aspect of learning privacy preserving text representation is to ensure that sensitive and private information of the users such as age, gender, and location is not captured in the latent representation.
An adversary cannot design a private attribute inference attack better than what it has already anticipated. In this spirit, we leverage the idea of adversarial learning. In particular, we seek to train a private attribute discriminator D P that can accurately identify the private information from the given representation, while learning a representation that can fool the discriminator and minimize leakage of private attribute w.r.t. the determined adversary, which results in a representation that does not contain sensitive information. Assume that there are T private attributes (e.g., age, gender, location). Let p t represents the ground truth (i.e., correct label) for the t-th sensitive attribute and θ D t P demonstrates the parameters of discriminator model D P for the t-th sensitive attribute. The adversarial learning can be formally written as:
where L D t P denotes the cross entropy loss function andp
) is the predicted t-th sensitive attribute using the k-th sample. The outer minimization finds the strongest private attribute inference attack and the inner maximization seeks to fool the discriminator by obscuring private information.
DPText -Learning the Text Representation
In the previous sections, we discuss how we can (1) add noise to prevent the adversary from reconstructing the original text from the latent representation and minimize the chance of privacy breach by satisfying differential privacy (Eq. 6), (2) control the amount of the added noise to preserve the semantic meaning of the textual information for a given task (Eq. 10), and (3) control the amount of the added noise so that user's private information is masked (Eq. 11). Inspired by the idea of adversarial learning, we achieve all three by modeling the objective function as a minmax game among the two introduced discriminators as follows:
where α controls the contribution of the private attribute discriminator in the learning process. This objective function seeks to minimize privacy leakage w.r.t. the attack, minimize loss in the semantic meaning of the textual representation, and protect private information. With N documents, Eq. 12 is written as follows:
} is the set of all parameters to be learned, Ω(θ ) is the regularizer for the parameters such as Frobenius norm and λ is a scalar to control the amount of contribution of the regularization Ω(θ ). Train semantic discriminator D S by gradient descent(Eq.10)
Train private attribute discriminator D P via Eq.11. 7: until Convergence
The aim of this objective function is to perturb the original text representation by adding a proper amount of noise to it in order to prevent an adversary from inferring existence of the target textual representation in the database, reconstructing the user's original text and learning user's sensitive information from the latent representation, while preserving the semantic meaning of the perturbed representation for a given specific task. We stress that the resultant text representation satisfiesε-differential privacy, whereε ≤ c 1 is the optimal learned privacy budget. This is further discussed in Section. 5.
Optimization Algorithm
The optimization process is illustrated in Algorithm 1. First, we compute the latent representation of all documents Z = {z i , ..., z N } in Line 1. We then sample a mini-batch of b samples from the training data and add noise to initial to initial text representation. Next, we train the semantic discriminator D S in Line 5 and private attribute discriminator in Line 6. Recall that we have a constraint on the variable ϵ, i.e., ϵ < c 1 . To satisfy this constraint, we use the idea of the projected gradient descent [18] wherein the gradient descent is performed one step, i.e. ϵ − γ × ϵ where γ is the learning rate. Then, the parameter ϵ is projected back to the constraint. This means that if ϵ > c 1 , then we set ϵ = c 1 , otherwise, keep the value of ϵ. The final noisy representationz can be then calculated for each given document according to the value of optimal learned privacy budget ϵ ≤ c 1 using Eq. 6. Note that any model can be used for semantic and private attribute discriminators.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Here, we show that the learned text representation using DPText isε-differential privacy whereε ≤ c 1 is the learned optimal privacy budget. In particular, we prove the privacy guarantee for the final noisy latent representationz for each given document. The theoretical findings confirm the fact that DPText minimizes the chance of revealing existence of textual representations in the database. Theorem 1. Letε ≤ c 1 be the optimal value learned for the privacy budget variable ϵ w.r.t the semantic meaning and private attribute discriminators. Let z i be the original latent representation for document x i , i = 1, ..., N inferred using Eq. 4 and. Moreover, let ∆ denotes the L 1 -sensitivity of the textual latent representation extractor function discussed in Section. 4.1. If each element s i (l), l = 1, ..., d in noise vector s i is selected randomly from Lap( ∆ ϵ ) (∆ = 2d), the final noisy latent representationz i = z i + s i satisfiesε-differential privacy.
Proof. First we bound the change of z when one data point in the database changes. This gives the L 1 -sensitivity of the textual latent representation extractor function discussed in Section. 4.1.
Recall the way z is calculated using Eq. 4. Function tanh is used in GRU to build the RNN which is used in Section. 4.1 to find the latent representation of a given document. The output of tanh function is within range [−1, 1]. This indicates that value of each element z(l), l = 1, ..., d in the latent representation vector z is within range [−1, 1]. If one data point changes (i.e., removed from the database), the maximum change in value of each element z(l) is 2. Since the dimension of z is d, the maximum change in the L 1 norm of z happens when all of its elements, z(l), have the maximum change. According to Definition. 2, the L 1 -sensitivity of z is ∆ = 2 × d. Now, assume thatε ≤ c 1 is the optimal value for the learned privacy budget. Then each element in s (i.e., s(l), l = 1, 2, ...d) is distributed as Lap( ∆ ϵ ) based on Eq. 6 which is equal to randomly picking each s(l) from the Lap( ∆ ϵ ) distribution, whose probability density function is Pr (s(l)) =ε 2∆ e −ε |s(l )| ∆ . Let D 1 and D 2 be any two datasets only differ in the value of one record. Without loss of generality we assume that the representation of the last document is changed from z n to z ′ n . Since the L 1 -sensitivity of z is ∆ = 2d, then ∥z n − z ′ n ∥ 1 ≤ ∆. Then we have:
where s n and s ′ n are the corresponding noise vectors with respect to the learnedε when the input are D 1 and D 2 , respectively. The first inequality also follows from the triangle inequality, i.e. |a| − |b | ≤ |a − b|. The last equality follows from the definition of L 1 -norm.
Since we have s n = r − z n and s ′ n = r − z ′ n , we can write:
This follows from the definition of L 1 -sensitivity. We rewrite Eq. 14:
So, the theorem follows and the final noisy latent representation isε-differentially private. □
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments on real-world data to demonstrate the effectiveness of DPText in terms of preserving both privacy of users and utility of the resultant representation for a given task. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions:
• Q1 -Utility: Does the learned text representation preserve the semantic meaning of the original text for a given task? • Q2 -Privacy: Does the learned text representation obscure users' private information? • Q3 -Utility-Privacy Relation: Does the improvement in privacy of learned text representation result in sacrificing the utility?
To answer the first question (Q1), we report experimental results for DPText w.r.t. two well known text-related tasks, i.e., sentiment analysis and part-of-speech (POS) tagging. Sentiment analysis and POS tagging have many applications in Web and user-behavioral modeling [32, 34] . Recent research showed how linguistic features such as sentiment are highly correlated with users demographic information [31, 46] . Another group of research shows the effectiveness of POS tags in predicting users' age and gender information [43] . This makes users vulnerable against inference of their private information. Therefore, to answer the second question (Q2), we consider different private information, i.e., age, location, and gender, and report results for private attribute prediction task. To answer the third question (Q3), we investigate the utility loss against privacy improvement of the learned text representation.
Task 1: Sentiment Analysis
Sentiment analysis is one of the important language processing applications. Next, we describe the used dataset and model.
Data.
We use a dataset from TrustPilot 4 from Hovy et al. [31] . On their website, users can write reviews and leave a one to five star rating. Users can also provide some demographic information.In the collected dataset, each review is associated with three attributes, gender (male/female), age, and location (Denmark, France, United Kingdom, and United States). We follow the same approach as in [39] and discard all non-English reviews based on LANGID.PY 5 [40] , and only keep reviews classified as English with a confidence greater than 0.9. We follow the setting of [32] and categorize age attribute into three groups, over-45, under-35, and between 35 and 45. We follow the setting of [40] and subsample 10k reviews for each location to balance the five locations.We consider each review's rating score as the target sentiment class.
Model and Parameter Settings. For the document auto-encoder
A, we use single-layer RNN with GRU cell of input/hidden dimension with d=64. For semantic and private attribute discriminators, we use feed-forward networks with single hidden layer with the dimension of hidden state set as 200, and a sigmoid output layer, which is determined through grid search. The parameters α and λ are determined through cross-validation, and are set as α = 1 and λ = 0.01. The upper-bound constraint c 1 for the value of parameter ϵ is also set as c 1 = 0.1 to ensure the ϵ-differential privacy, ϵ = 0.1 for the learned representation. Note that exploring the best sentiment predictor is not the focus of our work and it can be easily replaced by different models designed for this task.
Task 2: Part-of-speech (POS) Tagging
POS tagging is another language processing application which is framed as a sequence tagging problem [31] .
6.2.1 Data. For this task we use a manually POS tagged version of TrustPilot dataset in English. This data is obtained from Hovy et al. [32] and consists of 600 sentences, each tagged with POS information based on the Google Universal POS tagset [45] and also labeled with both gender and age of the users. The gender attribute is categorized into male and female, and age attribute is categorized into two groups over-45, under-35. We follow the setting of [39] and use Web English Tree-bank (WebEng) [16] as a pre-training tagging model because of the small quantity of text available for this task. WebEng is similar to TrustPilot datasets w.r.t. the domain as both contains unedited user generated textual data.
Model and Parameter
Settings. Similar to the sentiment analysis task, we use single-layer RNN with GRU cell of input/hidden dimension with d=64 for document auto-encoder A. For semantic discriminator (i.e., POS tag predictor), we use bi-directional LSTM:
where
is the input sequence with m words, h i is the i-th hidden state, h 0 and h ′ m+1 are terminal hidden states set to zero, [.; .] denotes vectors concatenation and ϕ is a linear transformation. The dimension of the hidden layer is set as 200. We apply a dropout rate of 0.5 to all hidden layers during training.
For the private attribute discriminator, we use feed-forward networks with single hidden layer with the dimension of hidden state set as 200, and a sigmoid output layer (determined via grid search). The input to this network is final hidden representation [h m ; h ′ 0 ]. For hyperparameters, we set values of α and λ as α = 1 and λ = 0.01 which are determined through cross-validation. The upper-bound constraint for the value of ϵ is also set as c 1 = 0.1. Note that exploring the best POS tagger is not the focus of our work and it can be easily replaced by different models designed for this task.
Experimental Design
We perform 10-fold cross validation for POS tagging and sentiment analysis tasks. We follow state-of-the-art research and report accuracy score to evaluate the utility of the generated data for the given POS tagging [19, 32] or sentiment analysis task [22] . In particular, for the sentiment prediction task, we report accuracy for correctly predicting rating of reviews. We also report tagging accuracy for POS tagging task. To examine the text representation in terms of obscuring private attributes, we report test performance in terms of F 1 score for predicting private attributes. Note that the private attributes for sentiment task include age, gender and location while private attributes for tagging task include gender and age.
We compare DPText in both tasks with the following baselines: • Original: This is a variant of DPText and publishes the original representation z without adding noise or utilizing D S and D P discriminators.
• DifPriv: This baseline adds Laplacian noise to the original representation z according to Eq. 6 (i.e., Lap( ∆ ϵ ), ϵ = 0.1, ∆ = 2d) without utilizing D S and D P discriminators. Note that this method makes the final representation ϵ-differentially private. We compare our model against this method to investigate the effectiveness of semantic and private attribute discriminators.
• ADV-ALL [39] : This method utilizes the idea of adversarial learning and has two components, generator, discriminator. It generates a text representation that has high quality for the given task but has poor quality for inference of private attributes.
In both tasks, semantic discriminator D S is trained on the train data and applied to test data for predicting sentiment and POS tags. Table 1 : Accuracy for sentiment prediction and POS tagging and F 1 for evaluating private attribute prediction task.
Similarly, we can apply private attribute discriminator D P where it plays the role of an adversary trying to infer the private attributes of the user based on the textual representation. Private attribute discriminator D P is also trained on the train data and applied to test data for evaluation. Higher accuracy score for semantic discriminator D S indicates that representation has high utility for the given task, while lower F 1 score for private attribute discriminator D P demonstrates that the textual representation has higher privacy for individuals due to obscuring their private information.
Experimental Results

Performance Comparison.
For evaluating the quality of the learned text representation, we answer questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 for two different natural language processing tasks, i.e., sentiment prediction and POS tagging. The experimental results for different methods are demonstrated in Table 1 . Utility (Q1). The results of sentiment prediction for DPText is comparable to the Original approach. This means that the representation by DPText preserves the semantic meaning of the textual representation according to the given task (i.e., high utility). DifPriv performs significantly better than DPText and the reason is that DPText applies noise at least as strong as DifPriv (or even more). Therefore, adding more noise results in bigger utility loss. We also observe that DPText has better performance in terms of predicting sentiment in comparison to ADV-ALL. The accuracy of POS tagging task is higher when DPText is utilized rather than when Original is used. This is because POS tagging results are biased toward gender, age and location [32, 34] . In other words, this information affects the performance of tagging task. Removing private information from the latent representation results in removing this type of bias for tagging task. Therefore, the learned representation is more robust and results in a more accurate tagging. DPText also has better performance than DifPriv due to removal of private information and thus bias. Besides, results demonstrate that DPText outperforms ADV-ALL. These results indicate the effectiveness of DPText in preserving semantic meaning of the learned text representation. Utility-Privacy Relation (Q3). For the sentiment prediction task, DPText has achieved the highest accuracy and thus reached the highest utility in comparison to other methods. It also has comparable utility results to Original. However, Original utility is preserved at the expense of significant privacy loss. Moreover, although DifPriv satisfies differential privacy and its performance is comparable with DPText for predicting sentiment, it performs poorly in obscuring private information. DifPriv may provide weaker privacy guaranty comparing with DPText since learned ϵ in DPText can be smaller than ϵ = 0.1 in DifPriv. In contrast, DPText has significantly better (best) results in terms of privacy compared to the other approaches and also achieves the least utility loss in comparison to ADV-ALL. For the POS tagging task, the resultant representation from DPText achieves the highest utility and privacy amongst all approaches. This shows the effectiveness of DPText in preserving semantic meaning and obscuring private information for more accurate tagging.
The results for two natural language processing tasks indicate that DPText learns a textual representation that (1) does not contain private information, and (2) preserves the semantic meaning of the representation for the given task.
Impact of Different Components.
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of different private attribute discriminators on obscuring users' private information. To achieve this goal, we define three variants of the proposed framework, i.e., DPText{Age/Gen/Loc}. In each of these variants, the model is trained with discriminator of just one of the private attributes. For example, DPTextAge is trained solely with age discriminator and does not use any other private attribute discriminators during training phase. The performance comparison is shown in Table 2 .
In sentiment prediction task, we observe that using solely one of the private attribute discriminators can result in a representation which performs better in terms of sentiment prediction, in comparison to DPText in which we use all three private attributes discriminators (i.e., higher utility). However, these variants perform poorly in terms of obscuring private attributes in comparison to the original DPText model. These results indicate that although using one discriminator in the training process can help in preserving more semantic, it can compromise the effectiveness of learned representation in obscuring attributes.
In the POS tagging task, results show that DPText achieves the best performance in tagging task (i.e., higher utility) in comparison to other methods that solely use one of the private attribute discriminators. The reason is that presence of age and gender related information in the text can negatively affect the tagging performance due to existing bias [32, 34] . DPText is thus more effective in removing this bias and leads to more accurate tagging in comparison to DPTextAge and DPTextGen. Similar to sentiment prediction task, we observe that DPTextGen with only gender attribute discriminator is less effective than DPText in terms of hiding private attributes information. DPTextAge however, has the best results in terms of obscuring age attribute information. 6.4.3 Parameter Analysis. DPText has one important parameter α which controls the contribution from private attribute discriminator D P . We investigate the effect of this parameter by varying it as {0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16}. Original-{Age/Gen/Loc} shows the results for the corresponding task when the original text representation has been utilized. Results are shown in the Fig. 2.(a-b) and Fig. 2.(c-d) for sentiment prediction and POS tagging, respectively.
Although α controls the contribution of private attribute discriminator, we surprisingly observe that in both sentiment prediction and POS tagging tasks with the increase of α, the F 1 scores for prediction of different private attributes decrease at first up to the point that α = 1 and then it increases. This means that the private attributes were obscured more accurately at the beginning with the increase of α and less later. Moreover, with the increase of α, the accuracy of sentiment prediction task decreases. This shows that increasing the contribution of private attribute discriminator lead to decrease in the utility of resultant text representation. In case of POS tagging, the accuracy first increases and then decreases after α = 1. This shows that removing the age and gender attributes related information results in removing the bias from learned text representation and improve the tagging task. However, after α = 1 the utility of resultant representation decreases. Those patterns are useful for selecting the value of parameter α in practice.
Moreover, in both tasks, setting α = 0.125 results in an improvement in terms of the amount of hidden private information in comparison to the results of using Original representation. This observation supports the importance of the private attribute discriminator. Another observation is that, after α = 1, continuously increasing α degrades the performance of hiding private attributes (i.e., increasing F 1 scores) in both sentiment prediction and POS tagging tasks. This is because the model could overfit by increasing α which lead to an inaccurate learned text representation in terms of preserving private attributes and semantic meaning of the text.
RELATED WORK
Explosive growth of the Web not only has drastically changed the way people conduct activities and acquire information, but also has raised numerous challenges [10, 12] including security [2] [3] [4] [5] and privacy [8, 11, 14] issues for them. Identifying and mitigating user privacy issues has been studied from different aspects on the Web and social media (for a comprehensive survey see [9] ). Our work is related to a number of research which we discuss below while highlighting the differences between our work and them. Differential Privacy Application in Social Media. Differential privacy has been used for many privacy preserving applications. For example, ϵ-differential privacy has been used to preserve privacy in graph data [49] . Another application of differential privacy is in recommendation systems that it is utilized to construct private covariance matrices [41] and private users' sensitive ratings [42] . Privacy Preserving Web Search. The search engine returns a list of web pages according to a user's query formed by one or more keywords. Privacy preserving web search approaches focus on anonymizing users search queries. One group of works focused on the protection of post-hoc logs [28, 37, 51] . Korolova et al. [37] releases a (ϵ, δ )-differential private query click graph. The work of Zhang et al. [51] makes a significant improvement over [37] by providing an (ϵ)-differential privacy. Another set of works includes client-side ones focuses on search query obfuscation [26, 33] which adds dummy search queries (collected from popular websites and searched query terms) on behalf of users.Beigi et al. [8] also proposes a method for preserving web browsing history by inferring how many and what links should be added to a user's browsing history to preserve his privacy while retaining the utility.
Preserving privacy of text is more challenging than web search privacy preserving since queries often include few keywords while text data consists of much larger numbers of words. Textual Data Anonymization. Few works consider the privacy of textual user data [6, 29, 39, 50] . The work of [29] introduces possible privacy threats of document repositories, 1) name entity recognition, and 2) author identification. It then introduces the concept of k-author anonymity to address the latter issue. However, this work failed to provide technical solutions to address the privacy challenges. Another work from Anandan et al. [6] studies removing PII from text. It first introduces t-Plausibility notion and then propose information theoretic based algorithms which select and generalize sensitive keywords to satisfy t-Plausibility. Its is that it does not address textual representation re-identification and removal of hidden private information. The work of Zhang et al. [50] introduces a verified version of differential privacy specified for textual data to overcome the curse of dimensionality problem, namely, ϵ-TextIndistinguishability and satisfy it by adding Laplacian noise. Another work [39] uses the idea of adversarial learning to generate text representation. Their framework consists of a generator which generates representation w.r.t. given task and a discriminator which ensures the representation does not contain private information. Our work is different from [39, 50] . First, [50] does not consider the task that given text will be used for. This results in a representation which lacks utility in practice. Moreover, this framework does not handle leakage of private attribute. However, the semantic and private attribute discriminators in DPText ensure the utility and privacy. Second, in [39] the input textual information could be recovered from the representation if the adversary has preliminary knowledge of the training model and this could be done easily through reverse engineering by a GAN attack algorithm [30] . Moreover, [39] does not consider the risk of text representation re-identification, while DPText does. DPText does not depend on the process of generating original representation and this representation could be generated via any model such as doc2vec [38] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a double privacy preserving text representation learning framework, DPText, which learns a text representation that (1) is differentially private, (2) obscures users' private information, and (3) retains high utility for a given task. It has four main components, 1) an auto-encoder, 2) differential-privacy-based noise adder, 3) a semantic meaning discriminator, and 4) a private attribute discriminator. Our theoretical and empirical results shows the effectiveness of DPText in minimizing chances of learned textual representation re-identification, obscuring private attribute information and preserving semantic meaning of the text. One future direction for this work is to generate privacy preserving text (e.g., sentences, paragraphs) rather than laten representation which is critical for having interpretable results. We also adopt Laplacian noise rather than Guassian noise as it provides stronger guarantees for differential privacy. Another future direction is to adopt Gaussian noise to satisfy differential privacy and further examine how it affects obscuring private attribute information and preserving semantic meaning of data. It would also be interesting to generalize the proposed model for other types of data, e.g., location traces.
